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JURISDICTION 
The Statement of Jurisdiction in the Appellant's Brief is 
accurate. 
ISSUES 
1. In ruling on cross motions for summary judgment, did 
the trial court correctly conclude as a matter of law in quash-
ing the preliminary injunction and in denying permanent injunc-
tive relief that: 
a. The covenant in the subdivision which restricts 
roofs to wood shingles is unenforceable because there has been 
a change in circumstances with regard to the character of the 
subdivision which neutralizes the benefit of the restriction 
or which is of such a nature as to render it valueless; and 
b. Roofing materials may be restricted under the covenants 
only if the color and quality of the material does not blend 
harmoniously with the character and environment of the subdi-
vision ? 
2. Also did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
denying appellant's motion for new trial ? 
The standards of review cited in the Appellant's brief are 
appropriate. 
DETERMINATIVE RULE 
Rule 56 (c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states in 
part with regard to summary judgment: "The judgment sought shall 
be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affi-
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davits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. 
This case involves a determination of the circumstances 
under which a trial court may, as a matter of law, correctly 
conclude that a particular provision of restrictive covenants 
is unenforceable because of changes which have occurred in 
the subdivision subject to the restrictions. 
- Course of Proceedings. 
The description of the course of the proceedings in the 
Appellant's Brief (pp 3-6) is accurate except that: 
The trial court viewed the subdivision with the consent 
of the parties. (R 360, 638) 
The trial court's minute entry speaks for itself, but the 
Appellant's brief fails to note that the Court found that there 
has been a substantial change of circumstances in the subdivi-
sion. (R 361). 
The allegation that the committee had tacitly approved 
non-wood roofs was first raised in the answer of the Appellees. 
(R 47) It was then addressed in the affidavit of Lynn B. Larsen 
(R 205). The affidavits filed by Appellees regarding this matter 
to which reference is made in Appellant's brief are not identi-
fied by reference to the record. However, such affidavits ap-
pear to be among those filed by Appellees (R 441, R 447) in 
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response to the affidavit of Peter M. Johnson supporting 
Appellant. (R 395) 
The Appellant's characterization of the trial court's 
modification of its minute entry (R 361) by its order (R 628) 
as being "substantial" is argumentative and conclusory. In 
fact the latter document did modify the former. 
Disposition in Trial Court. 
Again the statement in Appellant's brief regarding dispo-
sition in trial court is accurate except that: 
It is the contention of the Appellees that the key element 
in the trial court's disposition of this matter was its conclu-
sion that: "There has been a change in circumstances in the sub-
division which neutralizes the benefits of the restrictive 
covenant or which is or such a nature as to render it valueless, 
thus rendering the restriction unenforceable." 
- Statement of Facts. 
For purposes of this appeal only, the Appellees accept the 
statement of facts in the Appellant's brief except that: 
The facts as stated do not address what Appellees view as 
the pivotal conclusion in the trial court's order, the changed 
circumstances in the subdivision. As such the Appellant's state-
ment of facts is immaterial to the issue of changed circumstances 
in the subdivision on which the trial court's order stands. 
(R 361, R 631) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In its ruling, the trial court correctly considered the 
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change in circumstances of the subdivision with regard to the 
narrow requirement of the restrictive covenants that roofs must 
be of wood shingles. This the trial court did by touring the 
subdivision with counsel for the parties present. 
Based on the trial court's viewing of the subdivision, the 
court was able to confirm that over 28% of the residences have 
non-wood roofs, that some of the wood roofs were of shake rather 
than shingle, and that the wood roofs were not otherwise uni-
form. Comparing the wood roofs with the non-wood roofs, the trial 
court also observed that the wood roofs showed greater signs of 
wear than did the non-wood roofs. 
These observations were sufficient for the trial court to 
conclude correctly that the narrow "wood shingle" restriction has 
no further value. However, the trial court again correctly ruled 
that, even without the valueless wood shingle restriction, the 
overall purposes of the restrictive covenants would be advanced 
by requiring roofing materials to comply with the broader re-
striction that their color and quality be such that the materials 
blend harmoniously with the current neighborhood environment. 
Therefore the restrictive covenants as a whole, except for the 
narrow requirement that roofs be of wood shingles, were untouched 
by the trial court's ruling. 
These conclusions of the trial court were correct as a mat-
ter of law and were not based on disputed facts. Facts with re-
gard to which disputes exist relate to issues which need not be 
determined for this dispute to be resolved as a matter of law. 
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ARGUMENT 
1. A CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE SURROUNDING NEIGHBORHOOD 
MAY RENDER A PARTICULAR COVENANT NO LONGER ENFORCEABLE IF 
THE CHANGE IS SO GREAT THAT IT CLEARLY NEUTRALIZES THE 
BENEFITS OF THE RESTRICTION TO THE POINT OF DEFEATING ITS 
PURPOSE OR THAT THE CHANGE IS OF SUCH A NATURE AS TO RENDER 
THE COVENANT VALUELESS. 
This rule of law is stated in Crimmins v. Simonds, 636 
P.2d 478, 479 (Utah 1981). However, the Appellant's brief argues 
that the trial court incorrectly applied this rule and instead 
should have determined the outcome of the case by applying the 
doctrine of waiver. (Appellant's brief, 19). In doing so, the 
Appellant's argument does not question whether or not there has 
been a change of circumstances in the subdivision. Instead the 
argument challenges the trial court's concluding as a matter of 
law that the change either neutralizes the benefits of the re-
striction or is of such a nature as to render it valueless. 
The trial court did correctly apply the Crimmins rule in 
this case. 
The wood shingle restriction appears in section 2 of the 
covenants dealing with architectural control, and the recur-
rent emphasis of the section is that materials shall "blend 
harmoniously into the natural environment". The trial court 
observed that there was a lack of uniformity among the roofs, 
but that there was little difference in appearance among the 
roofs. 
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It is true that there are conflicting affidavits with re-
gard to the enhancement value of wood roofs. However the cove-
nants speak of maintaining, not enhancing, value; and there is 
nothing before the trial court which contradicts the observa-
tion that wood roofs, because of bleaching and warping, exhibit 
greater signs of wear than do the non-wood roofs. (R 629) 
The benefit of value of a particular restriction with re-
gard to which circumstances have changed can only be determined 
within the context of the purposes of the covenants and the 
values which the covenants seek to enhance or maintain. 
Given the undisputed changed circumstances of the subdi-
vision with regard to uniformity, the wood shingle restriction 
adds no benefit or value which cannot be maintained by other-
wise more broadly restricting the color and quality of roofing 
materials. 
2. THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER IS SUSTAINABLE BASED ON MATTERS 
WITH REGARD TO WHICH NO DISPUTE EXISTS. 
After hearing oral arguments on the cross motions for sum-
mary judgment, the trial court reserved ruling on the matter 
until the houses in the subdivision were viewed by the court. 
(R 3 60) It is uncontested that this was done with the consent 
of the parties. 
The law in Utah is that the mere existence of genuine issues 
of fact in the case as a whole does not preclude the entry of 
summary judgment if those issues are immaterial to the resolution 
of the case. Horgan v. Industrial Design Corp.. 657 P.2d 751, 752 
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(Utah 1982). 
If they would not establish a basis upon which plain-
tiff could recover, no matter how they were resolved, 
it would be useless to consume time, effort and ex-
pense in trying them, the saving of which is the very 
purpose of summary judgment procedure. The pertinent 
inquiry is whether under any view of the facts the 
plaintiff could recover. Abdulkadir v. Western Pacific 
Railway Company, 318 P.2d 339, 341 (Utah 1957). 
There is no question that it was appropriate for the trial 
court to observe the subdivision before ruling on the cross 
motions. For the court to have done otherwise would have been 
akin to its failing to read a contract whose enforcement would 
fall if found to be ambiguous. 
The question then is whether or not under any view of the 
circumstances the trial court could have determined that the 
benefits of the wood shingle restriction were not neutralized by 
the changed circumstances or that the restriction had value given 
the changed circumstances. 
The Utah Court of Appeals recently addressed the level of 
evidence required by a non-moving party to avoid summary 
judgment. 
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56 (c) mandates 
the entry of summary judgment ... against as party who 
fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the ex-
istence of an essential element to that party's case 
and on which that party would have the burden of proof 
at trial. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine 
issue as to any material fact," since a complete fail-
ure of proof concerning an essential element of the 
non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other 
facts immaterial. The moving party is "entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law" because the non-moving 
party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an 
essential element of her case with respect to which she 
has the burden of proof. Schafir v. HarriaanP 254 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 15, 18 (Utah App. 1994) quoting Celotex Corp. 
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v, Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 
2552 (1986). 
With regard to summary judgment in equitable matters, it has 
been said: "...[I]f there are no triable issues of fact and the 
court believes equitable relief is warranted, it is fully em-
powered to grant it on a Rule 56 Motion." Wright, Federal Prac-
tice and Procedure, v. 10A, p. 302 (1983). 
In the Missouri case upon which Appellant relies, Connelly 
v. Schafer, 837 S.W.2d 344 (Mo.App.W.D. 1992), the court found 
no reason to overrule the trial court's decision enforcing a re-
strictive roof covenant under circumstances different from those 
in the case now before this Court. However that case does serve 
to illustrate the distinct nature of the "changed conditions" 
issue from the "waiver" issue. Connelly at 347-348. 
When reviewing a matter for correctness under the law, the 
court may sustain the trial court on any legal ground, even one 
which the trial court did not address. See, for example, Higains 
v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 240 (Utah 1993). So in the 
case now before this Court it may view any of the trial court's 
conclusions of law and determine whether or not it is sustainable 
as a matter of law under undisputed facts which are material to 
that issue. 
Here the trial court was asked to enforce the narrow "wood 
shingle" restriction of the covenant, but the court had before it 
the undisputed fact that of the 81 houses built as of July 26, 
1991, there were 23 which were non-wood. (R 629) These numbers 
reflect a lack of conformity in 28% of the structures existing at 
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that time without taking into account wood roofs which used 
shakes instead of shingles. 
Additionally it is undisputed that the wood roofs showed 
greater signs of wear than did the non-wood roofs. (R 629) 
Finally it is undisputed that the covenants, even without 
the wood restriction, still provide that the color and quality 
of roofing materials must blend harmoniously with the current 
neighborhood environment. 
Viewing these undisputed facts in the context of the stated 
overall ends of the restrictive covenants, the trial court cor-
rectly concluded that the wood shingle restriction was no longer 
enforceable but that the color and quality of roofing materials 
must blend harmoniously with the character and environment of 
the subdivision. 
With the narrow wood shingle restriction now unenforceable, 
it was proper for the trial court to quash the preliminary in-
junction requiring compliance with the restriction and proper 
for the trial court to deny permanent injunctive relief to pro-
hibit deviation from a restriction which is no longer enforce-
able. 
3. WITH THE TRIAL COURT HAVING RULED THAT THE WOOD SHINGLE RE-
STRICTION IS UNENFORCEABLE, IT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT 
THERE WAS NO OTHER BASIS FOR GRANTING THE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
SOUGHT BY THE APPELLANT. 
With the trial court having determined that the wood shingle 
restriction of the covenants was no longer enforceable because of 
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changed circumstances, the Appellant's argument that a violation 
of the restriction per se was the cause of irreparable harm 
failed. The court provided the Appellant with the opportunity to 
sustain a finding that the Appellees' non-wood roof caused some 
other form of irreparable harm for which injunctive relief was 
appropriate. However, the trial court found no such basis which 
could not be offset by the requirement that roofs must be of a 
color and quality so as to blend harmoniously with the natural 
environment of the subdivision as it now exists. 
The trial court addressed this issue in its colloquy with 
Appellant's counsel at the hearing on November 8, 1993. (R 496-
497) 
4. THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING PROPERLY ALLOWS RESIDENTS OF THE 
SUBDIVISION TO COME BEFORE IT SEEKING RELIEF IF A PARTICU-
LAR ROOF DOES NOT COMPLY WITH THE COLOR AND QUALITY OF 
MATERIAL PROVISION OF THE COVENANTS. 
The trial court's ruling does not prevent any resident 
of the subdivision from seeking enforcement of the covenants with 
regard to the color and quality of roofing materials. However, 
the Appellant did not satisfy the trial court that the roofing 
materials used by Appellees caused harm which would merit injunc-
tive relief. 
5. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION IS DENY-
ING APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
On November 1, 1993, the Appellees submitted affidavits ad-
dressing issues, some new, which were raised in affidavits sub-
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mitted by the Appellant. The issues addressed in these affidavits 
were immaterial to a determination of whether or not changed cir-
cumstances in the subdivision rendered the wood shingle restric-
tion unenforceable; and even if they were material, the Appellant 
had the opportunity to submit counter affidavits, having filed a 
motion for new trial on December 31, 1993. (R 604) Additionally, 
the court heard oral arguments regarding the Appellant's motion. 
Therefore the trial court did not abuse its discretion is 
denying Appellant's motion for new trial. 
6. THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
FOR THE APPELLANT. 
If summary relief is to be granted Appellant, there 
must exist no genuine issue of material fact with regard to 
any possible basis for granting such relief. But even if it 
were found as a matter of law that circumstances did not 
change so as to render the wood roof restriction unenforce-
able, there are disputed facts upon which the final determi-
nation of that issue would rest. Likewise with regard to the 
issue of waiver. 
Therefore the record does not support summary judg-
ment for the Appellant. 
CONCLUSION 
As a matter of law the trial court correctly determined 
that the wood roof restriction of the covenants is unenforce-
able because of changed circumstances in the subdivision. 
Also as a matter of law the trial court correctly declared that 
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roofing materials are subject to generally applicable standards 
regarding color and quality under the covenants. Lastly, the 
trial court correctly determined the procedural rights of sub-
division residents are protected by affirming their right to 
seek relief under the circumstances of particular cases subject 
to generally applicable standards of equity and law. 
On the other hand, the trial court did not commit reversible 
error by denying Appellant's motion for summary judgment or by 
denying Appellant a new trial. 
Therefore the trial court's order should be affirmed. How-
ever, if it is not affirmed, the matter should be remanded for 
clarification by the trial court of its basis for ruling as it 
did under the law. 
Respectfully submitted this 15th dayLof September, l&$4/\ 
/ J 
Thomas 
Attorney for >pf>eIlea's1 
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